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ABSTRACT
After deﬁning Cosmopolitan Right as being limited to the conditions of “hospitality,”
Kant includes “Wirtbarkeit” in brackets, a word that connotes innkeeping. Moreover,
signiﬁcant similarities obtain between the relevant passages of the Perpetual Peace
and those of the Digest of Justinian on the obligations of ships’ masters, innkeepers,
and stable keepers. Unlike for ordinary householders, hospitality for innkeepers is a
legal obligation, not a matter of philanthropy: they have traditionally been deemed
public ofﬁcials with limited discretion to refuse travelers, and as ﬁduciaries of their
guests strictly liable for losses to their property. This article attempts to explain
Kant’s concept of Cosmopolitan Right by analogy to the private law of innkeeping,
and ultimately engages in the central philosophical debate about Cosmopolitan
Right by accounting for Cosmopolitan Right solely from the “innate” right to freedom,
rather than from “acquired” facts such as land or resource distributions or historical
injustices.
After introducing it under the caption “Cosmopolitan right shall be limited
to conditions of universal hospitality,” Kant begins his discussion of the
Third Deﬁnitive Article to the Perpetual Peace with the following comments:
Here, as in the preceding articles, it is not a question of philanthropy but of
right, so that hospitality (hospitableness) [Hospitalität (Wirtbarkeit)] means the
right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because he has arrived on
the land of another. The other can turn him away, if this can be done without
destroying him, but as long as he behaves peaceably where he is [auf seinem
Platz], he cannot be treated with hostility. What he can claim is not the right to
be a guest [Gastrecht] (for this a special beneﬁcent pact would be required,
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making him a member of the household [Hausgenossen] for a certain time),
but the right to visit [Besuchsrecht]. . .1
Although it does not feature in the later Doctrine of Right, the concept of hos-
pitality has nonetheless given rise to a small cottage industry. This is in part
because of the contrast between the “enigmatic” fashion of its description
and its “obvious centrality” to Kant’s general theory of law,2 and because
of the pressing need for a moral response to the massive waves of migration
produced by contemporary globalization. Amid the large amount of ink
spilled on the topic, one thing has mostly escaped comment: the word
Wirtbarkeit, included in parentheses for elucidation. This paper argues
that Kant is referring to innkeeping, such that cosmopolitan right and
the corresponding obligations of receiving states may be explained to
some extent by analogy to the law of innkeeping.
Section I begins by arguing that popular interpretations of the concept of
hospitality as “welcome” are incompatible with Kant’s fundamental commit-
ments in his practical philosophy. Section II returns to the passage from the
Third Deﬁnitive Article, and demonstrates the textual parallels with the
titles of the Digest of Justinian concerning the obligations of innkeepers. It
then brieﬂy summarizes the history of the law of innkeeping, from which
certain themes arise that will be relevant to the later theoretical discussion.
Section III sketches out the basic structure of Kant’s legal philosophy as
expressed in the Doctrine of Right. Finally, Section IV builds on previous sec-
tions to stake a position in the central debate surrounding the nature of cos-
mopolitan right. It argues that cosmopolitan right arises exclusively from
the innate right to freedom, rather than from an “acquired” entitlement
to equal distributive shares of the earth’s resources, or from a right to be
somewhere. Similarly, a receiving state’s cosmopolitan obligation arises sim-
ply from its status as a public person, and not from any kind of proprietor-
ship over sections of the earth’s surface.
Some ﬁnal caveats. Neither the discussion of the legal history of innkeep-
ing nor the use of the language of modeling or analogy are meant to sug-
gest that Kant constructs cosmopolitan right through a sort of Dworkinian,
interpretive rationalization of the positive legal practices he saw around
him. Rather, the legal commonplaces he calls on in his writings are not
used as evidence, much less as justiﬁcations, but as illustrations of his theo-
retical claims. The same applies here. References are made interchangeably
1. Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY: THE CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF
THE WORKS OF IMMANUEL KANT 311, 328–329 (8:357–358) (Mary J. Gregor ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press, 9th ed. 2006) (1795). Citations to the Doctrine of Right and the Perpetual Peace are denoted
with “DR” and “PP” respectively and cite the page numbers of the Akademie compilation of
Kant’s collected works, and of Mary Gregor’s translation. The preparatory draft for the
Perpetual Peace, cited as “DPP,” is available online at the Korpora database maintained by the uni-
versities of Duisburg and Essen.
2. Peter Niesen, Colonialism and Hospitality, 3 POL. & ETHICS REV. 90, 90 (2007).
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to Roman and English law because the common law of bailment is almost
wholly civilian in origin,3 with the law of innkeeping having had a particu-
larly close parallel development between England and the continent.4
I. HOSPITALITY AS WELCOME—SOME PROBLEMS
Translated into English, the string “hospitality (hospitableness)” seems tauto-
logical: the word in the brackets does nothing to explain the italicized tech-
nical term preceding it. Nevertheless, Mary Gregor’s editorial decision is
understandable. “Hospitality” sounds like the ethical sensibility shown by
hosts to guests,5 and this intuition seems to be conﬁrmed by the fact that
“Wirtbar” is deﬁned in Grimm’s Dictionary as an early eighteenth-century
poetic expression for “gastlich, einladend, freundlich.”6 Jacques Derrida,
one of the very few writers to pay attention to the word Wirtbarkeit, offers
a similar interpretation:
Wirt . . . is at the same time the patron and the host [hôte], the host who receives
the Gast, the Gastgeber, the patron of a hotel or restaurant. Wirtlich, like gastlich,
means “hospitable”, “welcoming.” Wirtshaus is the café, the cabaret, the inn,
the place that accommodates. And Wirt governs the whole lexicon of
Wirtschaft, which is to say, economy and, thus, oikonomia, law of the household.7
Likewise, Sarah Holtman interprets cosmopolitan right as connoting cer-
tain “social graces” of civility and hospitality, which may be thought of “as at
3. See Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 109–114 (1703); WILLIAM JONES, AN ESSAY ON THE
LAW OF BAILMENTS (London, Dilly, 1781), at 11, 35–41, 75–77. Story criticizes Jones’s “extreme
solicitude to make the principles of this branch of jurisprudence, as administered at Rome,
appear in harmony with the common law, as administered in Westminster Hall,” but concedes
that Lord Holt’s reasoning in Coggs v. Bernard “was greatly assisted by Bracton, and still more
by the civil law, from which Bracton had drawn his own materials.” JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS: WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE CIVIL AND THE FOREIGN LAW (Cambridge,
Hilliard & Brown 1839), at iv–v. Holmes in contrast contends that English bailment remains
fundamentally Germanic. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Harv. Univ. Press,
2009) (1881), at ch. 5.
4. Reinhard Zimmermann, Innkeepers’ Liability - Die Entwicklung der Gastwirtshaftung in England, in
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR CLAUS-WILHELM CANARIS ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG (VOLUME 2) 1435, 1437 (Andreas
Heldrich, Jürgen Prölss & Ingo Koller eds., 2007) (“Interessant ist die Gastwirtshaftung auch als
Zeugnis europäischer Rechtseinheit – sowohl historisch begründeter als auch durch moderne
Maßnahmen der Privatrechtsharmonisierung jedenfalls teilweise wiederlangter.”).
5. See Sarah Holtman, Civility and Hospitality: Justice and Social Grace in Trying Times, 6 KANTIAN
REV. 85, 100 (2002) (“[W]e often do think of those to whom we ascribe hospitality as having
developed a set of appropriately welcoming practices towards strangers. . . . We may attribute
hospitality to the person who always seems to know just the way to make a stranger, whether
the new colleague or the international visitor, feel welcome.”); Paul Formosa, Kant on the
Highest Moral-Physical Good: The Social Aspect of Kant’s Moral Philosophy, 15 KANTIAN REV. 1, 11
(2010) (“To be hospitable is to invite the other into your home or country, to share your
food and table, and to enter into peaceful social relations with him based on the respect
and love due to all humans, wherever they come from.”).
6. GRIMM’S DICTIONARY, available at http://dwb.uni-trier.de/de/.
7. Jacques Derrida, Hostipitality, 5 ANGELAKI 3, 4 (2000).
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once signs of, and helpmates to, moral virtue, which for the Kantian is itself
a helpmate to justice,”8 while Seyla Benhabib remarks that it is “unclear . . .
whether such relations among peoples and nations involve acts of superer-
ogation, going beyond the call of moral duty. . . .”9 In a series of dialogues
with Jürgen Habermas following the September 2001 attacks, Derrida sim-
ilarly describes hospitality as almost like courage:
Pure and unconditional hospitality, hospitality itself, opens or is in advance
open to someone who is neither expected nor invited . . . The visit might actu-
ally be very dangerous, and we must not ignore this fact, but would a hospital-
ity without risk, a hospitality backed by certain assurances, a hospitality
protected by an immune system against the wholly other, be true hospitality?10
For such reasons, Derrida concludes that the Kantian hospitality is
hopelessly contradictory; it envisages the reception of the visitor only “on
the condition that the host, the Wirt . . . maintains his own authority in
his own home . . . thereby afﬁrm(ing) the law of hospitality as the law of the
household, oikonomia, the law of his household, the law of a place (house,
hotel, hospital, hospice, family, city, nation, language, etc.) . . .”11 Likewise,
Benhabib considers that the concept of cosmopolitan rights of asylum suffers
from a fundamental confusion as to whether they are legally enforceable
norms or merely “reciprocal moral obligations” that states are not compelled
to recognize.12
The ﬁrst problem with such interpretations, and why they end in contra-
diction, is that they ignore Kant’s warning that he is talking about rights and
not philanthropy. He reiterates this point in the Doctrine of Right, which
states that cosmopolitan right is not “a philanthropic (ethical) principle
but a principle having to do with rights.”13 In fact, this distinction between
right and virtue constitutes the core of Kant’s practical philosophy. As a fun-
damental matter, law has nothing to do with the advancement of virtue,
because acts purporting to fulﬁll duties of virtue are worthless unless
done purely for the sake of the moral end. A shopkeeper does not fulﬁll
any duties of virtue if he deals honestly with his customers only in order
to retain their long-term patronage. Likewise, laws compelling honesty on
pain of sanction do nothing to advance the virtue of honesty, because
any resulting honest dealing would be for the sake of complying with the
law rather than for the sake of honesty itself. Simply put, a legal obligation
of welcome does not make sense; you cannot feel welcome if your host is
8. Holtman, supra note 5, at 4.
9. SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS (2004), at 28.
10. GIOVANNA BORRADORI, PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF TERROR: DIALOGUES WITH JÜRGEN HABERMAS AND
JACQUES DERRIDA (2013), at 128–129.
11. Derrida, supra note 7, at 4.
12. BENHABIB, supra note 9, at 29.
13. DR 6:352, 489. Recht can mean both “law” and “right,” in the sense of both an entitlement
as well as a correct state of affairs.
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legally required to be nice to you. The idea of welcome is conceivable only
because hosts are allowed to be awful to their guests.
Instead, the sole principle structuring right is the idea of “external free-
dom”; that is, the ability to make choices with the means at your disposal in
a manner compatible with a like ability on the part of all other persons to
do the same.14 In contrast to virtue, all that is needed to fulﬁll duties of
right is compliance with forms of interaction compatible with all persons
making choices for themselves using the means they rightfully have.
Whether or not the substance of a choice is ethically commendable is a sep-
arate and subsequent question. This why the Doctrine of Right comes before
the Doctrine of Virtue: for Kant, one must ﬁrst envisage the conditions under
which freedom is assured for all persons forever—peace. Only then can we
begin to talk about how to be a good person, because unless you are free,
your choices are not yours to be praised or blamed for. This basic idea is
illustrated by the remark that cosmopolitan right is simply the “rational
idea of a peaceful, even if not friendly, thoroughgoing community of all
nations on the earth. . . .”15 Peace is made between enemies, not friends.
Afterward, they may go on to become friends, or they may not. Only after
peace is conceived of is it worthwhile or even possible to think about friend-
liness, civility, or other supererogatory social graces between nations. Justice
is the helpmate to virtue, not the other way round.
The second problem is that the reliance on the ﬁgure of a master of a
household is difﬁcult to reconcile with the general distinction between pri-
vate and public law. Admittedly, Kant often likens states to parents, for
instance when he observes that
As natives of a country, those who constitute a nation can be looked upon
analogously to descendants of the same ancestors (congeniti) even though
they are not. Yet in an intellectual sense and from the perspective of rights,
since they are born of the same mother (the republic) they constitute as it
were one family (gens, natio). . . .16
This comparison, however, only emphasizes the difference between the
republic and a private household. The former envisages a materfamilias
“in an intellectual sense,” but contrary to Derrida, there is no ofﬁcial lan-
guage, religion, or ethnicity in her household. Accordingly, Derrida’s
notion of the “laws of a household” is un-Kantian insofar as it assumes
the preservation of ethnic, religious, or cultural bonds to be a proper
state function.17
14. DR 6:230, 387. This principle is designated as the “Universal Principle of Right.”
15. DR 6:352, 489.
16. DR 6:343, 482.
17. See DR 6:327, 469 (arguing that for a sovereign to establish an ofﬁcial religion would be
“beneath its dignity,” because thereby “the monarch makes himself a priest”); BENHABIB, supra
note 9, at 81:
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Thirdly, to imagine that Kantian cosmopolitan right imposes a duty to
welcome visitors, or to criticize it as othering and exclusionary of them, is
to gloss over his deep and persistent opposition to European colonialism
and imperialism.18 One of the crueler ironies of history is that the ﬁgure
of the refugee played a central role in justifying those projects. Consider
that Grotius begins the Free Sea—a legal opinion commissioned by the
Dutch East India Company—with a lamentation:
What men, what monsters, what inhuman race,
What laws, what barbarous customs of the place,
Shut up a desert shore to drowning men,
And drive us to the cruel seas again?19
Vitoria had earlier used these same lines from the Aeneid to defend the
Spanish conquest of the Native Americans as a just war.20 In fact, refugees
play an increasingly marginal role as Kant develops the concept of cosmo-
politan right: the Draft for the Perpetual Peace mentions shipwreck victims and
sailors caught in storms in passing as having rights of refuge,21 these speciﬁc
examples are omitted in the ﬁnal version, and the Doctrine of Right does not
mention them at all. In contrast, the critique of colonialism becomes
increasingly prominent. Kant devotes more than a page to this topic in
the Draft,22 and includes a blistering passage in the published version, in
which he takes note of the curious fact that European trading companies
in the Sugar Islands were constantly teetering on the brink of insolvency
despite practicing the “cruelest and most calculated slavery” there. Given
their abject failure as commercial enterprises, Kant speculates that their
real function was to train sailors for wars back home in Europe on behalf
of princes who made “much ado of their piety . . . while they drink wrong-
fulness like water. . . .”23 Finally, the section on Cosmopolitan Right in the
Doctrine of Right is almost entirely a critique of European settlement and
colonization.
Kant does not just condemn the enslavement of colonized peoples as
wrongful; he also emphasizes the corruption this brings on the colonizing
To view peoples as homogeneous entities characterized by a clearly identiﬁable ‘moral
nature’ and a source of ‘common sympathies’ is not only sociologically wrong; this view
is inimical to the interests of those who have been excluded from the people because
they refuse to accept or respect its hegemonic moral code.
18. See Niesen, supra note 2, at 91.
19. HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS, OR, THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO
TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE (James Brown Scott ed., Ralph van Deman Magofﬁn trans.,
Lawbook Exchange, 2001) (1609), at 8.
20. Francisco de Vitoria, On the American Indians, in VITORIA: POLITICAL WRITINGS 231, 278
(Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991) (c. 1532).
21. DPP 23:173.
22. DPP 23:174–175.
23. PP 8:359, 330.
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state. This same claim was expressed powerfully by one of his contemporar-
ies in the course of what may have been the ﬁrst campaign in history to
prosecute a multinational corporation for extraterritorial human rights
violations:
In India all the vices operate by which sudden fortune is acquired; in England
are often displayed, by the same persons, the virtues which dispense heredi-
tary wealth. . . . They marry into your families; they enter into your senate;
they ease your estates by loans . . . there is scarcely a house in the kingdom
that does not feel some concern and interest, that makes all reform of our
eastern government appear ofﬁcious and disgusting; and, on the whole, a
most discouraging attempt.24
This is what Kant means when he says that “a violation of right on one place
of the earth is felt in all. . . .”25 Kant’s statement is not, as might be imag-
ined, intended as a justiﬁcation for humanitarian interventions or the
“responsibility to protect.” Instead, it is a warning that colonialism always
corrupts the colonizer. The corresponding sentence in the Draft is emphatic
about this: it speaks of faraway atrocities that ultimately set the mother coun-
try ablaze with war.26 Kant’s “poor and minimal”27 deﬁnition of cosmopol-
itan right is not a bug in his legal-political theory; it is the feature. It permits
a clean break from earlier writers who, by formulating thick rights to visit,
trade, and proselytize, effectively supplied the intellectual foundations for
European colonialism, and thus the conditions for endless war.
For these reasons, Hospitalität cannot mean “hospitableness,” as Mary
Gregor translates it, but must have legal signiﬁcance. In this regard, how-
ever, Derrida might nevertheless be on to something. Recall his observation
that Wirtbarkeit is also suggestive of “the café, the cabaret, the inn. . . .”
II. HOSPITALITY AND THE LAW OF INNKEEPING
Of the 432 titles of the Digest of Justinian, two deal with the obligations of
innkeepers, alongside those of ships’ masters and keepers of stables.
Consider the passage by Ulpian on the “Action for Theft Against Ships’
Masters, Innkeepers, and Liverymen,” or furti adversus nautas caupones
stabularios:
24. EDMUND BURKE, MR. BURKE’S SPEECH ON MR. FOX’S EAST INDIA BILL (Dublin, White 1784), at
32–33.
25. PP 8:360, 330.
26. DPP 23:175 (“Ein Funke der Verletzung des Menschenrechts auch in einem andern
Welttheil gefallen nach der Brennbarkeit des Stoffs der Herrschsucht in der menschlichen
Natur vornehmlich ihrer Häupter die Flamme des Krieges leicht bis zu der Gegend verbreitet
wo er seinen Ursprung genommen.”).
27. Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Cosmopolitan Law, 9 EUR. L.J. 241, 245 (2003). Instead, Kant was con-
cerned that his understanding of cosmopolitan right would seem “fantastic and exaggerated.”
PP 8:360, 330.
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The innkeeper is answerable for the deeds of those whom he has in the inn to
run the establishment as also of those who reside in the inn; he is not answer-
able for the acts of passing travellers. For an innkeeper or liveryman is not regarded
as choosing his own traveller and cannot refuse those making a journey; but in a way,
the innkeeper does select his permanent residents, since he does not reject them, and so
should be answerable for what they do.28 (emphasis added)
Ulpian’s distinction between passing travelers, whom the innkeeper cannot
refuse, and permanent residents, whom the innkeeper does select, seems to
foreshadow Kant’s contrast between the “right to visit,” which a receiving
state cannot refuse, and the “right to be a guest,” which requires a “special
beneﬁcent pact.” Moreover, the innkeeper’s inability to refuse travelers
seems mirrored in a receiving state’s obligation under cosmopolitan right
to take in visitors who will be destroyed if turned away.
There is, of course, an obvious difference. Kant’s obligation to receive
arises only if turning the visitor away would result in her destruction; in
all other cases, a state’s cosmopolitan obligation is only to refrain from treat-
ing visitors with hostility. Except for this one case, states have full discretion
to turn visitors away. The parallel to this is in the other title of the Digest on
innkeepers—the “Action for Receipt” or receptum nautarum cauponum stabu-
lariorum—where the same jurist Ulpian, in apparent contradiction to his
commentary on the actio furti, comments that:
The praetor says: “I will give an action against seamen, innkeepers, and stable-
keepers in respect of what they have received and undertaken to keep safe,
unless they restore it.” This edict is of the greatest beneﬁt, because it is neces-
sary generally to trust these persons and deliver property into their custody.
Let no one think that the obligation placed on them is too strict; for it is in
their own discretion whether to receive anyone; and unless this provision were laid
down, there would be given the means for conspiring with thieves against
those whom they receive, since even now they do not refrain from mischief
of this kind.29 (emphasis added)
A. Innkeeping—A Short Legal History
This section provides a brief background and history of the law of innkeep-
ing, from which certain themes emerge that will be relevant for subsequent
theoretical discussion. These are, ﬁrst, that innkeepers are ﬁduciaries of
their guests; and second, that they are public ofﬁcials. The actio furti is codiﬁed
in the Institutes as one of the four quasi-delictual obligations; that is,
28. DIG. 47.5.1.6 (ULPIAN, AD EDICTUM 38), trans. ALAN WATSON, 4 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 275
(rev. ed. 1998).
29. Dig. 4.9.1 pr – 1 (ULPIAN, AD EDICTUM 14), trans. ALAN WATSON, 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN
160 (rev. ed. 1998).
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obligations arising “as if” by delict.30 It is not a delict proper, because
whereas delictual liability always requires fault or intention, liability under
the actio furti is strict. The actio de recepto is not categorized as a
quasi-obligation, presumably because it requires an underlying contract of
carriage, lodging, or stabling.31 Nevertheless, an innkeeper’s receptum liabil-
ity also cannot be explained purely as a matter of contract or delict. In fact,
the actio furti and the actio de recepto constitute vanishingly rare examples of
strict or vicarious liability in Roman law.32 If you transfer cloth to a tailor
that then is destroyed or goes missing, you can sue in contract for failure
to make the shirt, and in delict after proving fault. In contrast, innkeepers’
liability arises the instant the chattels are taken into custody, and cannot be
avoided even by express refusal to take care of the goods.33
As indicated by Ulpian’s commentary to the actio de recepto, the peculiar
historical reasons why innkeepers were treated so harshly had something
to do with social snobbery. A Roman inn or caupona was little more than
a brothel,34 and its “reputation was so bad that it was regarded as degrading
for a senator to lunch or dine in a caupona.”35 Not surprisingly, people oper-
ating such businesses were so unsavory that their guests were seen as in need
of particularly solicitous legal protection even (or perhaps especially) if they
were accommodated for free. The rediscovery of the Roman law in the elev-
enth century transposed these idiosyncracies of Roman social life on an
entirely different medieval context, a crucial aspect of which was the prolif-
eration of intracontinental travel for pilgrimage following the end of the
Black Death. From the early thirteenth century, English law required inn-
keepers to provide surety for the good behavior of foreign travelers, mean-
ing that innkeepers had to be “good and sufﬁcient persons”—a far cry from
the Roman caupo.36 In 1563, a French royal ordinance explicitly prohibited
innkeepers from refusing travelers without cause, the purpose of which,
according to David Bogen, was not so much aimed at ensuring accommoda-
tion for travelers, but at enforcing a public purpose of setting prices for
meals at inns and taverns.37 Nevertheless, the ofﬁcial duty evolved around
the same time into privately enforceable legal obligation. In England, this
30. J. INST. 4.5.3.
31. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN
TRADITION (1996), at 517.
32. See PETER BIRKS, THE ROMAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF PETER BIRKS (Eric
Descheemaeker ed., 2014), at 213; HOLMES, supra note 3, at 16–17; ZIMMERMANN, supra note 31,
at 1121–1122.
33. JONES, supra note 3, at 95; STORY, supra note 3, at 307 (§470).
34. Reinhard Zimmermann, Die Geschichte der Gastwirtshaftung in Deutschland, in USUS
MODERNUS PANDECTARUM: RÖMISCHES RECHT, DEUTSCHES RECHT UND NATURRECHT IN DER FRÜHEN
NEUZEIT; KLAUS LUIG ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 271, 274 (Hans-Peter Haferkamp & Tilman Repgen
eds., 2007).
35. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 31, at 516, n.51.
36. David S. Bogen, The Innkeeper’s Tale: The Legal Development of a Public Calling, 1996 UTAH
L. REV. 51, 60–61 (1996).
37. See id. at 84, and sources cited therein.
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was ﬁrst recognized in White’s Case, where the Court of Common Pleas rec-
ognized an “action on the case” or claim for loss against an innkeeper who
turned a guest away despite having room.38
It must be emphasized that the obligation to take all comers was a wholly
modern development; the law that controlled in Rome was, as provided for
in the actio de recepto, that innkeepers could refuse guests at will.39 Although
this was a matter of common knowledge, jurists nevertheless attempted to
ground the modern practice on the old Roman jurists by denigrating
Ulpian’s remarks about the actio de recepto in favor of those concerning
the actio furti. The strategies ranged from speculating that the actio de recepto
was incorrectly transcribed during the compilation of the Digest to inter-
preting the discretion referred to in it as about entering the profession
rather than about receiving individual travelers.40 In any event, by Kant’s
time, it was trite that innkeepers and other common carriers exercised a
uniquely public employment, such that they were not free to refuse guests
who could afford a reasonable sum for their lodgings.41
Notwithstanding innkeepers’ vastly improved social prestige, and their
new onerous public duties, the ancient rule of the strict liability of innkeep-
ers for damage or loss to guest property remained in place, and is in fact still
good law to this day.42 For a while, Ulpian’s old “innkeeper-as-scumbag” the-
ory proved remarkably resilient in justifying this situation, even though it
had long ceased to be convincing as a description of the hotel business,
let alone of other common carriers.43 The shift to a different, ﬁduciary ratio-
nale is apparent from Sir William Jones’s groundbreaking essay on the
English law of bailment:
For travellers, who must be numerous in a rich and commercial country, are
obliged to rely almost implicitly on the good faith of innholders, whose
38. White’s Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 343 (1558) (Eng.).
39. See STORY, supra note 3 at 307 (§470) (“[B]y the common law (which in this respect differs
from the civil law) an innkeeper is not, if he has suitable room, at liberty to refuse to receive a
guest, who is ready to pay him a suitable compensation.”). For reasons that cannot be explored
here, it appears that the actio furti, much like the other quasi-delicts, became obsolete very early,
perhaps even before the Digest was compiled. See Bogen, supra note 36, at 353–354.
40. See Bogen, supra note 36, at 355–357, and sources cited therein.
41. Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep., at 112 (deﬁning a category of bailees as exercising “a
publick employment,” and who were by law required to “carry goods, against all events but
acts of God, and of the enemies of the King”). A leading textbook on American innkeeping
law observes that this “duty is symbolised by the traditional ceremony at the dedication of a
new hotel or motel of throwing away a key to the inn, thus proclaiming to the world that
the door to the hospitality of the inn will never be locked and that all weary travelers will always
be welcome.” JOHN H. SHERRY, THE LAWS OF INNKEEPERS: FOR HOTELS, MOTELS, RESTAURANTS, AND
CLUBS (John E. H. Sherry ed., 3d ed. 1993), at 39.
42. Subject to statutory limits, of course. See, e.g., Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil
Code], Aug. 18, 1896, §701; Hotel Proprietors Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, C. 62 , §1(2) (Eng.).
43. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 31, at 521 (“Carriers by sea, innkeepers and stable keepers may,
of course, still be individually unreliable; but it can hardly be maintained that in their collec-
tivity, as members of the respective professions . . ., they are particularly disreputable. After all,
hotels without bawdyhouses are no longer that exceptional.”).
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education and morals are usually none of the best, and who might have fre-
quent opportunities of associating with rufﬁans and pilferers, while the
injured guest could seldom or never obtain legal proof of such combinations,
or even of their negligence, if no actual fraud had been committed by them.44
In contrast to Ulpian, Jones emphasizes the systematic vulnerability of the
traveler-innkeeper relation: from the fact that travelers have no choice
but to “trust these persons and deliver property into their custody,” it fol-
lows that they are “obliged to rely almost implicitly on the good faith of
innholders.” The impossibility of proving negligence, let alone intent,
means that guests and their “property are exposed to dangers emanating
from a sphere which only the other party is able to organize and control.”45
The innkeeper is liable not because he is a scumbag, but because he is a
ﬁduciary.46 In 1921, a South African innkeeper invoked the cessante ratione
cessat lex maxim to argue that the rule on the strict liability of innkeepers
had become obsolete.47 He lost.
Thus, the history of the law of innkeeping provides to some extent an
illustration of what Kant calls “empirical” and “metaphysical” theories of
law, as well as of his claim that empirical accounts are empty without a meta-
physics.48 As a matter of empirical or “blackletter” legal history, the inn-
keeper’s liability arose out of the professional disrepute of innkeepers.
“Metaphysically” however, the innkeeper’s liability can and must be
expressed rationally as a ﬁduciary obligation arising from the systematic vul-
nerability inherent in the very form of the guest-innkeeper relation.
III. PRIVATE LAW FOUNDATIONS OF KANT’S GENERAL
THEORY OF LAW
This section is intended to provide a synopsis of pertinent themes from
Kant’s theory of law. Readers already familiar with them may skip to the
next section.
44. JONES, supra note 3, at 96. See also ZIMMERMANN, supra note 31, at 516.
45. ZIMMERMANN, supra note 31, at 521. Zimmermann expresses this point in strikingly Kantian
terms elsewhere. See Zimmermann, supra note 4, at 1435 (“Hätte [der Gast] ‚regelmäßig den
Beweis einer dem Gastwirthe zur Lastfallenden Verletzung einer kontraklichen Pﬂicht,‘ als
Ursache für den eingetretenen Schaden zu führen, so wäre er weithin rechtlos.”).
46. See, e.g., Paul B. Miller, ATheory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 278 (2010) (deﬁn-
ing ﬁduciary relationships as those in which one person “exercises discretionary authority to set
or pursue practical interests (including matters of personality, welfare or right) of another”);
Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, ¶ 60 (Can.) (Wilson J., dissenting) (deﬁning a ﬁduciary
relation as one where “(1) the ﬁduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or
power; (2) the ﬁduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the ben-
eﬁciary’s legal or practical interests; and (3) the beneﬁciary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the
mercy of the ﬁduciary holding the discretion or power”).
47. Davis v. Lockstone 1921 A.D. 153, 159–160 (S. Afr.).
48. DR 6:229–230, 386–387.
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A. The Innate Right to Freedom and Its Expressions
In the Introduction to the Doctrine of Right, Kant deﬁnes rights in relational
terms as “(moral) capacities to put others under obligations.”49 Moreover,
legal rights are “always connected with an authorization to use coercion.”50
That is to say, for a claim of right to be legal rather than ethical, it means that
it is morally permissible to employ coercion against the addressee should
she refuse it. Thereafter, the “highest division” of rights is between “innate”
and “acquired” rights: an “innate right is that which belongs to everyone by
nature, independently of any act that would establish a right,” while “an
acquired right is that for which such an act is required.”51 Thus deﬁned,
there is only one innate right, or dignity inhering purely by virtue of being
human: “independence from being constrained by another’s choice . . .”52
Kant’s valuable insight here is that dignity does not consist in being sup-
plied with things necessary for the satisfaction of interests or needs. A slave
lacks dignity even if her master is extravagantly solicitous of her welfare
because, formally, she remains an object at her master’s mercy. As per
another fundamental distinction, a person is “a subject whose actions can
be imputed to him,” while a thing is an “object of free choice” to which
“nothing can be imputed.”53 Being treated “rightly” as a person—that is,
in accordance with one’s nature as a person—means being recognized as
subject to no laws other than those you give yourself, rather than as a
thing at the disposal of others. For the same reason, neither can dignity con-
sist in freedom understood in liberal terms as the ability to do whatever one
wants to do without constraint, for this would just be a roundabout way of
describing interest-satisfaction. The well-kept slave would lack dignity even
if the kindly master told her she could do anything she liked and went
on permanent holiday, for in formal terms she is no different than a dog
let off its leash. If someone should assault her, she would have no means
of lodging a complaint in her name, but would instead have to rely on
her strength or hope for free persons such as her master or kindly passersby
to intercede on her behalf.
This idea of an innate right to freedom can be expressed in a number of
different ways. One such expression is the concept of “rightful honor,”54
which Kant reformulates the ﬁrst of Ulpian’s three precepts of law—honeste
vivere—as a command to be a juridical person: “Do not make yourself a
mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them.”55
Rightful honor does not mean that you cannot pursue shameful purposes,
but only that you may not coherently do anything that effectively surrenders
49. DR 6:237, 393.
50. DR 6:231, 388.
51. DR 6:237, 393.
52. Id.
53. DR 6:223, 378.
54. DR 6:236, 392.
55. DR 6:236, 392 (referring to J. INST. 1.1.3).
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your ability to set purposes. For instance, you cannot contract to enslave
yourself, not because it would be disgraceful, but because it would be jurid-
ically nonsensical. Such a contract envisages you assuming an obligation to
become a thing, which, by deﬁnition cannot have obligations. Any attempt
to perform on it would therefore automatically release you from it.56
Another expression of innate right is something Kant calls the quality of
being “beyond reproach.”57 If another accuses you of wrong, they must
prove it, not you. You can never be required to clear your own name.
This basic case gives rise to one exceptional case: if someone wrongs you
by spreading defamatory rumors about you, you do not need to prove the
falsity of the rumor. Rather, the defendant has the burden of proving
that her allegation is true. If the burdens were otherwise, you would poten-
tially have to spend your entire life putting out any small ﬁres others might
see ﬁt to start, thus rendering yourself a thing at the disposal of all others. A
third way of expressing the innate right to freedom is as the “original com-
mon possession of the earth,” and Kant grounds cosmopolitan rights to visit
on this particular expression. We return to this in Section IV.
B. Acquired Right, or Private Right
The innate right to freedom gives rise to three kinds of “acquired” rights: “a
right to a thing (ius reale), or a right against a person (ius personale), or a
right to a person akin to a right to a thing (ius realiter personale), that is, pos-
session (though not use) of another person as a thing.”58 This crucial pas-
sage can be explained as follows: a thing can potentially be both used and
possessed at the same time.59 Your dignity lies in being treated as a person
and not as a thing; that is, as mere means. As such, this does not mean that
you cannot be possessed or used as means, but only that you cannot be pos-
sessed and used at the same time. From this arise three possible combinations
of rights and obligations legitimately enforceable through coercion:
(1) Rights to things: These entitle one person to prevent all other persons
from interfering with the things she is rightfully controlling in pur-
suit of her purposes—her property and body.60
(2) Rights against persons: These entitle one person to use another person.
For instance, your employer gets to use you in pursuit of her pur-
poses. If she uses you, however, she cannot also possess you. You
56. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2009), at
135–136.
57. DR 6:238, 394.
58. DR 6:260, 412.
59. See DR 6:270, 421 (“An external object which in terms of its substance belongs to some-
one is his property (dominium), in which all rights in this thing inhere (as accidents of a sub-
stance) and which the owner (dominus) can, accordingly, dispose of as he pleases (ius
disponendi de rea sua).”).
60. RIPSTEIN, supra note 56, at 66–69.
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must have signed up for the job, and you can always quit. These
rights are to performances; to delivery, not title.61
(3) Rights to persons akin to rights to things: These entitle one person to pos-
sess another. If you are a child, your mother can tell you to eat your
vegetables, and you must do it. If your attorney accepts a settlement
offer, you did it. They “bind” you by their decisions. However, if they
possess you in this manner, they cannot also use you. Whatever deci-
sions they make in respect of you have to be consistent with your pur-
poses, never theirs. It works the other way as well: because they
possess you, you can use them. Their “status” in relation to you is
an “external object of choice” in your possession, just like a contrac-
tual performance owed to you, or a thing in your rightful control.62
For the sake of convenience, these are scripted as ﬁduciary
relations.63
These basic categories reﬂect those of delict, contract, and quasi-
obligation in the Roman law of obligations.
C. Public Right
Like the social contract theorists, Kant argues that none of the above rela-
tions of private right are secure in a condition of pure private interaction, or
“state of nature.” However, Kant takes the much more radical position that
rights are not just inconvenient or inconclusive in the state of nature, but
impossible. Crucially, Kant inverts the order of Grotian and Lockean natu-
ral rights theories, which in various ways justify the existence of the state as
being for the protection and more efﬁcient enjoyment of full-ﬂedged prop-
erty rights already existing in the state of nature. Instead, Kant claims that
the lawful condition precedes conclusive property rights.64 There is no
property without law: a peremptory right to use and possess an external
thing to the exclusion of all others requires nothing less than the individual
consent of everyone in the political community. However, since the (meta-
physical, not empirical) process of obtaining such consent would place you
at the mercy of everybody, we must instead postulate a political institution
capable of expressing the individual consent of all the members of the
political community in the form of a single, “omnilateral” will. The partic-
ular institution manifesting this omnilateral will is the representative
61. DR 6:274, 424.
62. DR 6:247, 402 (enumerating three categories of external objects of choice as “1) a (cor-
poreal) thing external to me; 2) another’s choice to perform a speciﬁc deed (praestatio); and 3)
another’s status in relation to me”).
63. RIPSTEIN, supra note 56, at 70–76 (describing “status” relations, of which the “legal relation
between a ﬁduciary and a beneﬁciary is one such case”).
64. DR 6:255–256, 409 (“It is possible to have something external as one’s own only in a rightful con-
dition, under an authority giving laws publicly, that is, in a civil condition.”).
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legislature.65 In other words, the state is not so much “founded” on prop-
erty rights. Instead, it founds those rights.
The inversions do not stop there: Kant’s contract is not “formed” by par-
ties in the state of nature. Instead, it forms those parties. This notion may be
explained by contrasting Kant with familiar liberal tenets. On a liberal con-
ception of “negative freedom” or freedom as noninterference, the com-
mands of political authorities are always necessarily restrictions on
freedom, even if they ultimately increase the scope of action or the range
of interests satisﬁed.66 If, however, freedom is understood as being assured
that no other person will dominate or instrumentalize you, then it becomes
more obvious that it cannot exist without a set of political institutions autho-
rized to posit your rights in law and enforce them coercively.67 Authority is
not just compatible with freedom, but necessary for it.68 This is why Kant
“prefers to speak of an original contract rather than a social contract.”69 It
represents—again conceptually, not empirically70—the choice that makes
choosing even possible.
This has two implications. First, in contrast with ordinary private contracts
where it is entirely up to the parties whether or not to cooperate, the idea of
the original contract envisages forms of cooperation that are mandatory.
This is not because the welfare beneﬁts of being in the civil condition are
so great that we can presume that you have consented to cooperate.
Rather, it is because being in the civil condition is a prerequisite for your
even having the capacity to choose. You become free by submitting to author-
ity. If you decline to consent to the original contract, you are choosing to be
unfree, which is juridical nonsense, because choosing is only for the free.
Rightful honor therefore compels you to choose to join the rightful condi-
tion. Alternatively, persons remaining outside the original contract are
essentially reserving for themselves the choice to use violence against all
others as and when they please. Others need not abide this. Indeed they
must not, for they would violate their dignity if they did.71 Nor would they
wrong you by using violence against you. Outside the original contract
you are unfree, and so can be forced—forced to be free.
65. See DR 6:258–259, 411–412.
66. See, e.g., Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 123 n.2 (1969)
(“Law is always a fetter, even if it protects you from being bound in chains that are heavier than
those of the law, say, some more repressive law or custom, or arbitrary despotism or chaos.”).
67. DR 6:316, 459 (“One cannot say: the human being in a state has sacriﬁced a part of his
innate outer freedom for the sake of an end, but rather, he has relinquished entirely his wild,
lawless freedom in order to ﬁnd his freedom as such undiminished, in a dependence upon
laws, that is, in a rightful condition, since this dependence arises from his own lawgiving will.”).
68. DR 6:242, 397 (“. . . [A] state of nature is not opposed to social but to a civil condition, since
there can be society in a state of nature, but no civil society (which secured what is mine by
public laws).”).
69. B. SHARON BYRD & JOACHIM HRUSCHKA, KANT’S DOCTRINE OF RIGHT: A COMMENTARY (2012), at
174–175.
70. See PP 8:297, 296–297; DR 6:318, 461–462.
71. See PP 8:349, 322; DR 6:307, 452.
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Second, the state is an extension in public right of the idea of a ﬁduciary
in private right.72 Because it claims authority over you—that is, the entitle-
ment to determine your legal rights and obligations—the state’s powers
in respect of you are compatible with dignity only if exercised in a ﬁduciary
capacity.73 We saw earlier that Kant describes the republic as the common
mother. Kant utilizes precisely the example of parenthood to illustrate the
category of rights to persons akin to rights to things. In an argument mod-
eled on negotiorum gestio, Kant argues that parents are obligated to care for
their child because they decided to bring it into the world without ﬁrst
obtaining its consent. This obligation of care, however, gives rise to rights
against the child: “they also have a right to constrain it to carry out and com-
ply with any of their directions that are not contrary to a possible lawful free-
dom . . .”74 The same rationales of the beneﬁciary’s incapacity to consent,
and the ﬁduciary’s obligation of good faith apply in state-subject relations.75
Most human beings no more choose their political communities than they
select their parents. Moreover, just as a beneﬁciary requires the intercession
of her trustee to enjoy her trust property, neither can an individual enjoy
her innate right to freedom without the state.
At this point, another stark difference arises between Kant and other
social contractarians, in that the latter tend to conceive of the state as an
aggregation of natural persons to celebrate their common sympathies, pro-
tect their property rights,76 or serve as a clearinghouse mediating between
them with respect to their basic needs.77 In contrast, Kant pictures the state
as a moral person in its own right, with purposes separate and distinct from
those of its subjects. This, for instance, is the basis for Kant’s remark that
extracting reparations from the population of a defeated enemy
“would be robbery, since it was not the conquered people who waged the
war; rather, the state under whose rule they lived waged the war through
72. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1879) (“The power of governing is a trust
committed by the people to the government. . . . The people, in their sovereign capacity, have
established their agencies for the preservation of the public health and the public morals, and
the protection of public and private rights.”); Black River Regulating Dist. v. Adirondack
League Club, 121 N.E.2d 428, 433 (N.Y. 1984) (“. . . the power conferred by the Legislature
is akin to that of a public trust to be exercised not for the beneﬁt or at the will of the trustee
but for the common good.”).
73. See Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, 58MCGILL L.J. 969, 1012–1013 (2013) (“[F]idu-
ciary power is not properly understood as connoting relative strength, ability, or inﬂuence . . .
[but] ought to be understood as a form of authority,” or the ability to “render rightful conduct
that would otherwise be wrongful.”).
74. DR 6:360, 495.
75. See EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY (2011), at 44–47, 121–
125.
76. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690), at 64
(ch. 8, §120) (“By the same Act therefore, whereby any one unites his Person, which was before
free, to any Commonwealth, by the same he unites his Possessions, which were before free, to it
also; and they become, both of them, Person and Possession, subject to the Government and
Dominion of the Commonwealth, as long as it hath a being.”).
77. See, e.g., Henry Shue, Mediating Duties, 98 ETHICS 687 (1988).
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the people. . . .”78 The separate personalities of sovereign and subject is in fact
baked into the ﬁduciary model of authority. States have to be more than just
aggregations of subjects because it would otherwise become impossible to
judge and criticize the former’s treatment of the latter. Any subjects dis-
agreeing with the directives of the state would effectively be contradicting
themselves. This is why, in Peter Birks’s excellent phrase, ﬁduciary obliga-
tions of competence and disinterestedness are “inseverably compound”;79
they contemplate one person taking “positive steps in the interest of
another.”80
The distinctness of the state’s personality and purposes from those of its
subjects is illustrated by Ronald Dworkin’s metaphor of an orchestra. An
orchestra is more than just an aggregation of individual musicians playing
particular notes on particular instruments at particular times.81 Moreover,
its members “do not suppose that the orchestra also has a sex life, in
some way composed of the sexual activities of its members, or that it has
headaches, or high blood pressure, or responsibilities of friendship, or cri-
ses over whether it should care less about music and take up photography
instead.”82 Instead, the orchestra has just one purpose: making music.
Accordingly, the difference between private ﬁduciaries and sovereigns is
that the set of purposes that the latter can act on is much narrower.
Private persons can set and pursue private purposes, such as the celebration
of religious rituals. States can do no such thing because as public ﬁducia-
ries, they have just one public purpose: guaranteeing the equal freedom
of the people.83 As persons, states also have a natural right to freedom
that is unachievable in an international state of nature. Equally, law is not
just compatible with the freedom of states, but necessary for it. They too
must enter into an international rightful condition.
The distinction between public and private persons gives rise to a second
trichotomy of legal categories: that of constitutional, international, and cos-
mopolitan right.84 Unlike the ﬁrst trichotomy of private right, which repre-
sents the possible combinations of possession and use between persons and
things, the second trichotomy represents the possible combinations of
interactions between public and private persons. Constitutional right covers
legal relations (1) between a state and its subjects, and (2) between subjects
of the same state. As for international right, Kant departs from both his con-
temporaries and ours to deﬁne it as covering only relations between states.
Finally, cosmopolitan right covers legal relations (1) between sovereigns
and nonsubjects, and (2) between subjects of different sovereigns. These
78. DR 6:348, 485.
79. Peter Birks, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISRAEL L. REV. 3, 33 (2000).
80. Id. at 37–38 (emphasis added).
81. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2000), at 226.
82. Id. at 227.
83. DR 6:318, 461.
84. DR 6:311, 455.
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three taken together form the sum total of public right: if any one of these
categories is missing, “the framework of all the others is unavoidably under-
mined and must ﬁnally collapse.”85 Underneath the ediﬁce of public right,
however, lie the three basic forms of private right. Because delict, contract,
and ﬁduciary relations represent the three possible ways in which coercion
may be used consistently with freedom from domination, their structures
are not limited to private law but animate all claims of right, including con-
stitutional law, international law, and cosmopolitan law.86
IV. EXPLICATING COSMOPOLITAN RIGHT
We are now in a position to explore the content of cosmopolitan right and
the meaning of hospitality. The scholarly literature divides into two camps.
One argues that cosmopolitan right may be explained solely in terms of the
innate right to freedom. While not exactly claiming cosmopolitan right to
be an acquired right per se, the other camp envisages it nevertheless as a
sort of “proto-property” right. This paper agrees with the ﬁrst camp: cosmo-
politan right has nothing to do with property, proto- or otherwise. An inn-
keeper’s obligation of hospitality results not from her ownership of real
estate, but from her status as a public ﬁduciary. The same applies to states.
Demonstrating this requires an examination of the concept of the “original
common possession of the earth.”
A. Common Possession of the Earth’s Surface: The Innate Right to
Take Up Space
Recall that the refugee is merely an exceptional case for cosmopolitan right.
The basic case is that of a visitor who has a state to return to. Recall also that
the visitor cannot claim the right to be a guest, because that requires a spe-
cial pact. All she has is the right to “to present oneself for society.”87 The
receiving state can reject her outright; the only thing it cannot do is “pun-
ish” the visitor simply for appearing at the border. This right, according to
the Perpetual Peace, “belongs to all human beings by virtue of the right of
possession in common of the earth’s surface on which, as a sphere, they
cannot disperse inﬁnitely but must put up with one another; but originally
no one had more right than another to be on a place on the earth.”88 The
Doctrine of Right expands on this idea in a passage that bears repeating in
full:
[S]ince possession of the land, on which an inhabitant of the earth can live,
can be thought only as possession of a part of a determinate whole, and so as
85. Id.
86. Public right contains “no further or other duties of human beings among themselves
than can be conceived” at private right. DR 6:306, 451.
87. PP 8:358, 329.
88. Id.
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possession of that to which each of them originally has a right, it follows that
all nations stand originally in a community of land, though not of rightful com-
munity of possession (communio) and so of use of it, or of property in it;
instead, they stand in a community of possible physical interaction (commer-
cium), that is, in a thoroughgoing relation of each to all the others of offering
to engage in commerce with any other, and each has a right to make this attempt
without the other being authorized to behave toward it as an enemy because it
has made this attempt.89
Cosmopolitan right is “grounded” on original common possession of the
earth in this way. What, however, does “grounding” mean? We may illustrate
this as follows. Recall that the simplest category of private right is delict,
which essentially envisages two free persons interacting as strangers in an
arm’s-length relation to one another. This rightful relation is disturbed
when one party wrongfully interferes with the other’s means, in which
case an award of damages must be given to restore the original estrange-
ment.90 The “interference” does not have to be dramatic or painful: a
stranger who merely runs their ﬁngers through your hair is liable to you
in battery. Though substantively harmless, she nevertheless commits a
civil wrong against you simply because she has formally treated you as a play-
thing at her disposal, thereby contradicting your innate right manifested as
rightful honor. However, that same stranger does you no wrong if she taps
you on the shoulder, say, to ask you for directions, or to offer you something
for sale. This is because her “use” of your body is for communicating with
you, and this is a purpose you simply must share. To deny this would be to
presume that anything she might possibly say to you is wrongful, thus liter-
ally turning her into an untouchable. This contradicts her innate right, this
time expressed as the right to be beyond reproach. Innate right “grounds”
acquired rights in this way: it is not itself a legal claim, but it informs and
structures legal claims in delict, contract, or unjust enrichment.
The arm’s-length relation between the visitor and the receiving state
envisaged under cosmopolitan right is similarly structured by deeper,
more fundamental entitlements. These are, namely, the visitor’s right to
make an offer to contract, which the receiving state is entirely free within
its innate right to reject.91 As the passage from the Doctrine of Right indicates,
the right of the visitor not to be treated as an enemy seems to be grounded
partly in his innate right of “communicating his thoughts.”92 However, the
89. DR 6:352, 489.
90. ANDREW S. BURROWS, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON CONTRACT, TORT AND
RESTITUTION (1998), at 10–11.
91. See PP 8:359, 329–330 (approving the Chinese and Japanese policies of denying or
severely restricting entry to European traders). See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 276 (June 27) (“A State is not
bound to continue particular trade relations longer than it sees ﬁt to do so, in the absence
of a treaty commitment or other speciﬁc legal obligation.”).
92. DR 6:238, 394. See also Niesen, supra note 2, at 92.
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passage also focuses closely on the fact that as embodied agents, visitors nec-
essarily occupy space on a planet where space is limited. This gives rise to a
right that is innate: it “precedes any acts . . . that would constitute rights.”93
This is explained as follows. The ﬁrst and crucial point is that your body is
not a thing you possess and use to exercise your agency. Instead, your body
is your person. Someone who commits a battery against you does not merely
wrongfully interfere with your purposes—say, in playing sports. They wrong-
fully interfere with you. The fact that persons are innately embodied means
that they are entitled to take up the particular spot where they happen to be
at any particular moment, which by deﬁnition cannot be taken up by any-
one else.94 Seen this way, your “possession” of the ground under your feet is
“disjunctive”—it entitles you “neither to authorize anything nor to bind any-
one.”95 All it entitles you to is to remain there for so long as it takes you to
remove to some other location. This is reﬂected in Kant’s formulation of
the visitor’s right as against being treated with hostility so long as he behaves
peaceably “where he is.”96 In the section of the Doctrine of Right speciﬁcally
dealing with the original acquisition of land, Kant describes it as the right of
persons “to be wherever nature or chance (apart from their will) has placed
them.”97
These elemental considerations reveal why cosmopolitan right plays a
central role in Kant’s general theory of law, even though he devotes less
than two pages to it. Nevertheless, his anti-colonialism makes him contem-
plate even this minimal right with distaste. He observes that visits were often
accompanied by attempts to establish colonies connected with the mother
country, which then provided “the occasion for troubles and acts of vio-
lence in one place on our globe to be felt all over it.”98 Nevertheless, this
is as far as he will go: “this possible abuse cannot annul the right of citizens
of the world to try to establish community with all and, to this end, to visit all
regions of the earth.”99
Up to this point, there is no conceptual difference between the visitor’s
right to approach the receiving state and her right to approach a private
person. The state, like a Roman caupo, has the full discretion whether or
not to receive a visitor/guest. This changes once the receiving state ﬁgura-
tively brings the visitor infra hospitium by accepting the visitor’s offer to
engage in commerce.100 It now wields authority over the visitor, who
93. DR 6:262, 415.
94. RIPSTEIN, supra note 56, at 372 (“Your body enables you to set and pursue purposes in
space and time, but you must do so in a way that is consistent with the ability of other embodied
rational beings to set and pursue their purposes in time and space.”).
95. Id. at 156.
96. PP 8:358, 329.
97. DR 6:262, 414.
98. DR 6:353, 489.
99. Id.
100. See Hallman v. Federal Parking Services, 134 A.2d 382, 384 (D.C. 1965), citing Calye’s
Case, 8 Co. Rep. 32a, 77 Eng. Rep. 520 (1584).
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must obey the laws of the land. As a result, its relationship with the visitor is
transformed from delictual or contractual to ﬁduciary. Not only must the
receiving state not itself interfere with the person and property of foreigners
through its ofﬁcials, it must also ensure that the Hausgenosse refrain from
the same, and punish them if they do not. The “due diligence” obligations
owed by states to other states with respect to the treatment of aliens in their
territory can be accounted for in this way. Each state bears a “negative obli-
gation to abstain from directly taking measures (through actions of its own
organs) aimed at attacking the security of aliens,” as well as a “positive obli-
gation to protect aliens from harmful activities carried out by third persons
(private individuals or the organs of other international entities) on its ter-
ritory,” which entails “both an obligation to prevent harmful activities and
an obligation, if such activities have occurred, to punish the persons respon-
sible for the wrong suffered by the alien.”101
The ﬁduciary relationship between the receiving state and visitor arises
much more quickly—in fact instantly—in the case of a refugee who has
nowhere to return to. In such cases, the receiving state’s obligation toward
the stateless person mirrors its obligations corresponding to its citizens’
socioeconomic rights—for instance to adequate housing and food—
which are grounded not in interests or needs, but in the state’s sole purpose
of ensuring the equal freedom of all subjects.102 A homeless person may not
sleep on the streets without making a public nuisance of herself. Nor may
she sleep on the property of another without committing the wrong of tres-
pass. As such, she is systematically dependent on the kindness of strangers
for her occupation of space. If this is not forthcoming, she does wrong sim-
ply by standing in one place. Nobody could consent to such conditions con-
sistently with rightful honor, which means that the provision of adequate
affordable housing must be a clause of the mandatory contract creating
the constitutional order.103
[O]nce the property of a guest is taken into the custody and control of the innkeeper
the goods are considered infra hospitium and the liability for loss or destruction of the
goods imposed is that of an insurer, unless the property is lost or destroyed by an act
of God, the public enemy, or by fault of the guest.
See also STORY, supra note 3, at 312 (§478 (4)).
101. Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International
Responsibility of States, 35 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 9, 22 (1992). See also JOANNA KULESZA, DUE
DILIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016), at 224–226.
102. Kant says that the moral obligation to enter into an original contract means the state
must provide “the means of sustenance to those who are unable to provide for even their
most necessary natural needs.” DR 6:326, 468. This and the surrounding passages are unusual
and differ from the general tenor of his legal theory. Instead, contemporary interpreters largely
reconstruct the Kantian argument from more typical freedom-based premises. See, e.g., RIPSTEIN,
supra note 56, at ch. 9; Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J. Criddle, The Fiduciary Constitution of Human
Rights, 15 LEGAL THEORY 301, 330–332 (2009); Ernest J. Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant’s
System of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 810–821 (2002).
103. RIPSTEIN, supra note 56, at 279–281.
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In the same way, a refugee ﬂeeing a war has no rightful condition back
home, nor can she settle on the high seas, for these must be kept free to
all for travel. Because it would otherwise be inconsistent with innate
right, the refugee’s offer cannot be understood other than as one seeking
to join a rightful condition, which in turn means that it must be met with
acceptance. What Kant intends by Untergang is not physical destruction
per se, but civil death.104 Authority is necessary for freedom, and human
beings left without it are destroyed as persons. A receiving state’s cosmopol-
itan obligation, therefore, is not to offer “world citizenship, but [to ensure]
the division of the world into states in a way that guarantees that each per-
son has a home state to return to.”105 This means that if you have no home
state, the ofﬁcials of the receiving state “have to let you stay, simply in your
capacity as a citizen of the world.”106 The receiving state’s discretion “runs
up against its own internal limit.”107 The refugee must be taken in, thus
birthing her into the civil life that is hers by innate right.
To illustrate, consider Watson v. Cross, an American authority commonly
cited for the rule that innkeepers cannot refuse minors.108 In that case, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected an attempt by a minor—“infant” in
what was then Kentucky judicial parlance—to evade two weeks of hotel
charges by arguing that his contract for lodging was invalid for lack of capac-
ity. The court ruled instead that the innkeeper held a valid lien over the
plaintiff’s goods because he was under an obligation “to receive and enter-
tain all guests apparently responsible and of good conduct, who might
come to his house . . . and the mere fact of infancy alone in the applicant
would not justify him in any such refusal.”109 As such, simply in virtue of
their status as public ofﬁcials, innkeepers are obligated to enter into obliga-
tions with human beings who normally cannot have obligations. The same
applies for the public person of the state.
Thus, innate right is really all one needs to elaborate cosmopolitan right
on either side of the interaction, both in the ordinary case of visitors with a
rightful condition to go back to, and in the exceptional case of refugees
with nowhere to go.
B. Rights to an Equal Share of the Earth, Historical Redress, or to
Be Somewhere
The opposing view is that accounting for cosmopolitan rights and obliga-
tions requires knowledge of further and better “facts about the world.”110
104. This term is used in a different sense than Kant does in his discussion of bankruptcy at
DR 6:362, 497.
105. RIPSTEIN, supra note 56, at 297.
106. Id. at 298.
107. Id.
108. Watson v. Cross, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 147 (1865). See SHERRY, supra note 41, at 40–41.
109. 63 Ky. (2 Duv.), at 148.
110. Niesen, supra note 2, at 90.
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These may concern questions of resource distribution, historical injustice,
or even just geographical speciﬁcation.
One version of this argument from equal distribution is provided by Peter
Niesen, who, in earlier work, argued for the “derivation of cosmopolitan law
from acquired rights to property”111 on a view of original common possession
as implying some form of equitable distribution of resources. From the pre-
mise that “unilateral acquisition obligates individuals and nations towards
each other,”112 Niesen observes that the carving up of the world into separate
plots and territories “has causally shaped the life chances of our fellow cos-
mopolitan residents,”113 such that appropriations of territory—even if blame-
less and not a result of colonial crimes—result “in a distribution of property
that can be challenged and will have to be either ratiﬁed or corrected in a
cosmopolitan condition.”114 Similarly, Claudio Corradetti views the cosmo-
politan right to visit “as a limitatory clause to peremptory appropriation,
that is, as a generalised guarantee of non-exclusion from territorial accessibil-
ity.”115 Corradetti opines that “from the acceptability of an original appropri-
ation . . . it follows that those who are excluded by territorial seizure must be
compensated through the allocation of a qualiﬁed right—the right to visit—
in order to respect their original right to have a place on earth.”116 In
explaining this compensatory principle, Corradetti refers to the Lockean pro-
viso, according to which enclosures of land in the state of nature are conclu-
sive as long as they ensure “enough, and as good, left in common for
others.”117 In contrast, Alice Pinheiro Walla ropes in Grotius, who—as we
saw from his reliance on the Aeneid—considers property rights to be defeasi-
ble in cases of necessity. From the premise that property is created out of
common possession for the greater welfare of human beings, it follows that
property rights become defeasible when (1) the thing can be enjoyed by oth-
ers without any cost to the owner,118 or (2) excluding others would result in
secular disaster. On these lines, Pinheiro Walla argues that “cosmopolitan
right in Kant’s theory has a similar function to the right of necessity in
Grotius and imperfect rights in Pufendorf’s theory.”119
111. Id. at 105.
112. Id. at 102, citing KATRIN FLIKSCHUH, KANT AND MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2000), at 152.
113. Niesen, supra note 2, at 103.
114. Id. at 104.
115. Claudio Corradetti, Constructivism in Cosmopolitan Law: Kant’s Right to Visit, 6 GLOBAL
CONST. 412, 414 (2017) (citations omitted).
116. Id. at 421.
117. LOCKE, supra note 76, at 19 (ch. 5, §27), cited at Corradetti, supra note 115, at 421–422.
118. GROTIUS, supra note 19, at 38:
If any person should prevent any other from taking ﬁre from his ﬁre or light from his
torch, I should accuse him of violating the law of human society. . . . Why then, when it
can be done without any prejudice to his own interests, will not one person share with
another things which are useful to the recipient, and no loss to the giver?
119. Alice Pinheiro Walla, Common Possession of the Earth and Cosmopolitan Right, 107
KANT-STUDIEN 160, 176 (2016).
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One immediate issue is that these arguments smuggle internal consider-
ations about the substance of choices into Kant’s purely formal theory of
law. For instance, Niesen considers the protections afforded to voluntary
travelers as justiﬁed in part on the ethical obligation of peoples not to
seclude themselves.120 Corradetti for his part tries to avoid such consequen-
tialism by specifying that his reliance on the Lockean proviso “reformulates”
it to pay no heed to questions of need.121 However, it is difﬁcult to see how
this changes anything because leaving behind enough and as good is nei-
ther good nor enough to justify excluding others. For Kant, land before
original acquisition is not res nullius:122 others have just as good a claim to
it, which cannot be extinguished by unilateral occupation or speciﬁcation.
If you try to exclude others from a plot of land on the basis that you have
labored on it and grown enough apples to feed them, they may justiﬁably
reply that they care not for apples, and—even if they did—that it was not
your place to decide that they will have apples. Nor, from the opposite
end, does Kant accept a right of necessity. Necessity enters Kant’s general
theory not as a justiﬁcation but as a defense, and even then only against
criminal rather than civil liability.123
The most interesting problem for present purposes, however, lies in the
common assumption that territory is akin to property,124 which is itself pre-
mised on a deeper assumption that “states and peoples . . . take an active
part in the process of unilateral appropriation” of their territory.125 To
wit, it is an obvious empirical fact that political communities discovered,
conquered, or stole the land they now have. Metaphysically, however, states
do no such thing: they come into existence at the same time as their terri-
tory. Territory is not acquired, but innate in the manner of body.
Recall that innateness means being able to say that something is yours
independently of any act you did to get it, while acquiredness implies
some such act. Your sunglasses are acquired: if someone else had bought
them from the shop before you, they could very easily have been hers,
not yours. Thus, property has the aspect of being “mine or yours”;126 it is
120. Niesen, supra note 2, at 101–102.
121. Corradetti, supra note 115, at 421.
122. DR 6:265, 417, cited at Corradetti, supra note 115, at 418.
123. DR 6:235–236, 391–392 (arguing that to posit a “right of necessity” confuses the posses-
sion of a right or “objective impunity” with “subjective impunity”).
124. See Pinheiro Walla, supra note 119, at 174 (cosmopolitan right “presents itself under two
different modes: (1) as basis of the acquired right of host peoples to their territory, enabling
them to decline voluntary interaction . . .”); Niesen, supra note 2, at 105 (“[T]he most plausible
justiﬁcation for legal rights and obligations under hospitality lies in their enmeshment with the
logic of ﬁrst appropriation of territorial property.”). Niesen has modiﬁed this view in subse-
quent work. See infra note 133.
125. Niesen, supra note 2, at 103. See also Corradetti, supra note 115, at 423 (“[T]he instan-
tiation of a public authority is not only required for the purpose of constraining, under the
law, unilateral appropriations of the will through the creation of states, but also in view of com-
pensating, as it were, those subjects who are excluded from such appropriations.”).
126. DR 6:246, 401.
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by default transmissible because “what is yours might as well be, and might
come to be, not only mine, but his, hers, theirs, and so on.”127 Bodies,
among other things, are not like this. You do not have to account for
how you came to possess it, because if you did not have your present
body, there would not have been a you to acquire it. Alternatively, consider
that if you and a friend were to exchange all your belongings, your lifestyles
would be transformed—perhaps immeasurably—but the two of you could
still carry on with the identities you ordinarily present to the world. Not
so if you exchanged bodies. Bodies are not “mine or yours,” nor are they
transmissible. Instead, they are by default inalienable.
All these are also true of territory. Acquiring territory is not something a
state can do, because before it has any territory, there is no state to do any
acquiring. A state’s land holdings may increase through silting or volcanic
activity, but this is analogous to you growing a beard or having a heart trans-
plant. Taken as a “totality”—a plurality considered as a unity—the state sim-
ply is the territory.128 Ruritania and Cagliostro would not simply be altered
if they exchanged their territory, natural endowments, and people. They
would cease to exist. This is precisely Kant’s point in the Second
Preliminary Article, which observes that
a state is not (like the land on which it resides) a belonging (patrimonium) . . .
Like a trunk, it has its own roots; and to annex it to another state as a graft is to
do away with its existence as a moral person and to make a moral person into a
thing, and so to contradict the idea of the original contract, apart from which
no right over a people can be thought.129
The distinction Kant seems to draw between the state and its land must not
be taken to mean that the territory might be patrimony, even if the state
itself is not. While Kant states that title to territory is held by the head of
state acting as the “Supreme Proprietor,” he deﬁnes that function solely
as organizing the “division” of land among subjects, and emphatically not
as an aggregation of private ownership claims.130 The latter would be
127. James Penner, On the Very Idea of Transmissible Rights, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
PROPERTY LAW 244, 256 (James Penner & Henry Smith eds., 2013).
128. On the fundamental reasons disqualifying territory as property, see Arthur Ripstein, Kant
and the Law of War (Jun. 28, 2018) (unpublished manuscript, on ﬁle with author), at 54–55.
Nevertheless, Ripstein resists the conclusion that territory is like body on the grounds that a
state’s “boundaries may change . . . through its own ofﬁcial acts, including wrongful ones,”
such that “what was once the territory of one state may have become the territory of another.”
Other reasons are the provisional nature of state possessions in the international state of nature
(citing DR 6:350, 487) and the idea that wrongs against bodies involve the subordination of one
person’s choice to another’s, while wrongs against territory involve one legal order being sub-
ordinated to another. Ripstein, supra, at 55–56. For brief responses to these points, see text
accompanying notes 135–146.
129. PP 8:344, 318.
130. DR 6:323–324, 466.
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inimical to eternal peace, because, as Kant knew from experience, the pat-
rimonial state generates incessant war. Writing in the wake of the Austrian
Wars of Succession and the Seven Years’ War—two world wars sparked off
by a woman ascending to the Habsburg Throne in violation of ancient
Frankish tribal traditions—Kant remarks that
Everyone knows into what danger the presumption that acquisition can take
place in this way has brought Europe, the only part of the world in which it
is known . . . that states can marry each other, partly as a new industry for mak-
ing oneself predominant by family alliances even without expending one’s
forces, and partly as a way of extending one’s possession of land.131
Accordingly, the Second Preliminary Article requires that “No indepen-
dently existing state (whether small or large) shall be acquired by another
state through inheritance, exchange, purchase or donation.” Contrary to
Derrida, neither the state nor its head can be treated as a master in his
own home, for “if the head of state is not a member of the state but is pro-
prietor . . . he can decide upon war, as upon a kind of pleasure party . . .”132
To treat their territory as property to be bought and sold is to render the
human beings on it into things to be bought and sold; in effect, civil death.
In more recent work, Niesen attempts to reconcile notions of territorial
redistribution with the inalienability of territory in the rightful international
order by means of positing a two-step transition process from a “private” to a
“public” international state of nature.133 In the private international state of
nature, the land of the political community is simply held as the provisional
property of the prince. The adoption of the Second and other Preliminary
Articles then transforms this land into inalienable territory, but rights in it
remain provisional since we are still in a state of nature, albeit now a public
one. Only after the adoption of the Deﬁnitive Articles is the land conﬁrmed
as the peremptory territory of the state in an international rightful condi-
tion. In the interim between the two states of nature, Niesen contends
that territorial re-assignations should occur in order to reverse territorial
transfers contrary to the Second Preliminary Article. In support of this argu-
ment, Niesen cites to certain comments about restoring land in the Perpetual
Peace, and to the statement in §61 of the Doctrine of Right that the external
things states “acquire or retain by war” remain provisional outside the
131. PP 8:344, 318.
132. PP 8:351, 324. See also Arthur Ripstein, Just War, Regular War, and Perpetual Peace, 107
KANT-STUDIEN 179, 188 (2016) (“If states are essentially private and subject to the claims of pri-
vate right, disputes about them will multiply, and war becomes a means of acquisition.”).
133. See Peter Niesen, Restorative Justice in International and Cosmopolitan Law, in KANT AND
COLONIALISM: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 170 (Katrin Flikschuh & Lea Ypi eds.,
2014); Peter Niesen, “What Kant Would Have Said in the Refugee Crisis”, 50 DANISH Y.B. PHIL.
83, 91–96 (2017).
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international rightful condition.134 On this basis, he argues that cosmopol-
itan right incorporates not just considerations of fair resource distribution,
but also the reversal of historical wrongs.
As an ethical matter, the attraction of Niesen’s argument is obvious: the
fact that a foreigner comes from a country that was previously dominated
or is currently being exploited by the receiving state must weigh signiﬁ-
cantly in the use of administrative and legislative discretion as to whether
to issue her a visa, or perhaps to extend her voting rights and citizenship.
As a legal matter, however, these factors seem irrelevant: it is hard to see
how a refugee’s right to be taken in could be less weighty if she came
from a country not previously oppressed by that state. Of course, the refu-
gee’s claim may appear “more” weighty if she did come from such a coun-
try, but what more weight would you need? Besides, the comment about
restoring land features in the course of a discussion of the spurious excuses
a monarch might offer to put off the adoption of the Preliminary Articles
indeﬁnitely.135 However, incorporating the reversal of historical wrongs
into the concept of cosmopolitan right—a Deﬁnitive Article—would have
precisely this effect. Every encounter with a foreigner would involve the
re-litigation of historical grievances, an endless reopening of ancient
wounds making peace forever unachievable.
Secondly, provisionality goes to the stability or security of a right while
alienability pertains to its content: a right can be inalienable yet precarious.
Kant envisions the land of “savages”—arguably the prime exemplars of a pri-
vate international state of nature—in precisely this way. He speciﬁcally denies
the application of the Lockean proviso to indigenous peoples in his state-
ment that while colonies may be established on land truly far away from
them, they are not allowed if the “people are like shepherds or hunters . . .
who depend for their sustenance on great open regions . . .”136 The reason,
it is submitted, is because even though such peoples do wrong in the highest
degree by remaining outside a rightful condition, others are in no position to
hold this against them. As Ripstein puts it, “whatever uncertainty there is with
respect towhomay act on behalf of this people, the visitormust accept that the
visitor itself is not so charged, and so must not take it upon itself to make
arrangements for the inhabitants.”137 A people’s land is not to be treated
134. PP 8:347, 321; DR 6:350, 487. Discussed in Niesen,What Kant Would Have Said, supra note
133, at 95.
135. PP 8:347, 321 (“[H]e may not postpone to a nonexistent date (ad calendas graecas, as
Augustus used to promise) putting into effect the law, for example, to restore in accordance
with number 2 the freedom of certain states deprived of it, and so not restore it. . . .”).
136. DR 6:354, 490. Contrast this with Locke’s infamous claim that all persons have a right to
terra nullius—deﬁned broadly as not just unoccupied but also uncultivated land. LOCKE, supra
note 76, at 21–23 (ch. 5, §§32, 36).
137. Arthur Ripstein, Kant’s Juridical Theory of Colonialism, in KANT AND COLONIALISM: HISTORICAL
AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 145, 165 (Katrin Flikschuh & Lea Ypi eds., 2014). See also Martin Ajei
& Katrin Flikschuh, Colonial Mentality: Kant’s Hospitality Right Then and Now, in KANT AND
COLONIALISM: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 221, 246 (Katrin Flikschuh & Lea Ypi eds.,
2014):
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as contingent transferrable property just because they lack a republican
constitution.
Interestingly, Kant goes on to say that a settlement may be established with
uncivilized peoples by contract, but speciﬁes that such a contract must “not
take advantage of the ignorance of those inhabitants with respect to ceding
their lands.”138 As we have seen, Kant envisages a spectrum of contracts rang-
ing from mandatory to prohibited. Ordinarily, however, contracts are by
default voluntary, and their validity does not depend on the reasons why
they were entered into. It may be idiotic to sell your Maserati for a pepper-
corn, but you have the right to make such an offer, and the obligation to
deliver if someone accepts. A settlement contract with native peoples is evi-
dently not an ordinary contract for buying and selling property. Instead, its
onerous requirement of informed consent is reminiscent of the curious pas-
sages in the Doctrine of Right concerning sexual intercourse. In these, Kant
begins by observing that because a “human being cannot have property in
himself, much less in another person,” it follows that intercourse for mere
carnal enjoyment constitutes “cannibalistic . . . use by each of the sexual
organs of another . . .”139 Such use of another’s body makes each participant
“a consumable thing (res fungibilis) with respect to the other, so that if one
were to make oneself such a thing by contract, the contract would be contrary
to law.”140 While the legal systems the reader may be familiar with hopefully
do not follow this rationale fully, it nevertheless informs laws concerning sex
work and other bodily alienations such as organ transplantation and eutha-
nasia. These are often prohibited, or if allowed, not on commercial terms. If
they are permitted commercially, efforts are made to ensure that such activ-
ity is the result of genuine and informed choice rather than vulnerability and
exploitation. Kant applies the same logic to the territory of a people—civi-
lized or savage—because it is akin to the body of their state.
Again, Kant’s ideas ﬁnd illustration in the evolution of the international
law of territory. While early case law allowed for “acquisitive prescription” of
territory through effectivités (effective administration) by explicit analogy to
the prescription of land in municipal law,141 current practice is the polar
opposite, allowing transfers of territorial sovereignty only with the positive
acquiescence of the transferor.142 The rationale behind the new rule is
For all [visitors] know, stateless peoples do in fact possess political institutions. . . . This
stance expresses an epistemic modesty against which the cautiously formulated right to
attempt contact makes good sense. In our dealings with distant strangers . . . [w]e should
accept that they are agents in their own right, with reasons for action, about which we
are likely to know and understand very little.
138. DR 6:354, 490.
139. DR 6:359, 494–495. On the rule that no free man can be viewed as owning his limbs, see
DIG. 9.2.13.8 (ULPIAN, AD EDICTUM 18).
140. DR 6:359–360, 495.
141. Island of Palmas (Neth./U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 867–869 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
142. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, ¶¶ 63–67 (Dec. 22); Land, Island
and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.; Nicar. intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351, ¶¶ 223–
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peace: no matter how poorly drawn by former colonial powers, existing bor-
ders must be respected in order “to prevent the independence and stability
of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the
challenging of frontiers. . . .”143 For similar reasons, the World Court has
twice rejected “Lockean proviso”-style arguments for borders to be adjusted
in order to effect more equitable distributions of natural resources.144
Finally, ample evidence of the civil destruction of human beings is provided
by past and present practices of acquiring or holding territories by pur-
chase, grants in perpetuity, lease, international mandate, and condo-
minia.145 New Hebrideans used to joke that the former system of
British-French joint rule of their islands was not so much a condominium
but pandemonium,146 while the leased territories that still exist today—
think of Guantánamo Bay and Diego Garcia—are primarily known for law-
lessness, torture, and mass dispossession.
According to a recent study by Madeline Gleeson, it would appear that
much the same can be said about “offshore” Refugee Processing Centres
(RPCs) set up in Nauru and Papua New Guinea under the current
Australian government’s asylum policy. Gleeson’s account paints a picture
of these places as carefully constructed states of nature: administrative pro-
cedures are deliberately designed to ensure that “it would never be entirely
clear who was really making the decisions,”147 which is obviously ideal for
deﬂecting scrutiny into conditions in the camps, or for denying responsibil-
ity for the harrowing stories of abuse and self-mutilation.148 At various
points, Gleeson describes the countries hosting the RPCs using asylum seek-
ers as bartering chips in exchange for developmental aid.149 Finally, there is
the suggestion of the corruption of the body politic: she quotes a statement
by the Greens Senator Christine Milne to the effect that competing to be
more unattractive than the circumstances from which refugees are running
from only ends with the national political discourse “becoming crueller and
224 (Sept. 11). However, the standards for acquiescence can be quite lax. In Pedra Branca the
court held that sovereignty over a disputed island had passed from Malaysia to Singapore effec-
tively by silence. Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South
Ledge, (Malay. v. Sing.) 2008 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 121 (May 23).
143. Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J., at ¶ 20.
144. Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 473, ¶ 107 (Feb. 24); Land, Island and
Maritime Frontier Dispute, 1992 I.C.J., ¶¶ 40, 57–58.
145. Hersch Lauterpacht, Property Relations Between States. State Territory, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:
VOLUME 1, THE GENERAL WORKS: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 367, 370 (Eli
Lauterpacht ed., 1970).
146. MICHELLE BENNETT & JOCELYN HAREWOOD, VANUATU (2003), at 14.
147. MADELINE GLEESON, OFFSHORE: BEHIND THE WIRE ON MANUS AND NAURU (2016), at 28 (ch. 5).
148. The author was herself unable to visit the RPCs personally. A running theme of the
book is her being sent from pillar to post by the different state authorities claiming that some-
one else was in charge.
149. GLEESON, supra note 147, at 25 (“Refugees could be a resource too, the small nation
[Nauru] would soon discover. . . . Despite the MOU’s emphasis on ‘joint cooperation’ to com-
bat people smuggling, it was a commercial transaction – not a regional responsibility-sharing
arrangement.”).
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crueller and crueller . . .”150 However, if a refugee’s right was primarily
about having a fungible share of the earth’s land—a “right to be some-
where”—what exactly would be the principled objection against offshore
RPCs? After all, if cosmopolitan right was a matter of compensating for
inequities in land shares arising from original appropriation or for meeting
the demands of necessity, what would it matter if the land offered was
located here, there, or in Nauru?
In a recent piece, Jakob Huber purports to identify a difﬁculty with the
argument from pure innate right advocated here, on the grounds that if
original common possession is a “right to be granted a place somewhere on
the earth such that the conditions of agency are fulﬁlled,” it simply cannot
be an innate right.151 Rather, it would have to be an acquired right display-
ing the “mine and yours” quality, because “somewhere” could be here or
there. From the other direction, Niesen argues that the right against
being treated with hostility cannot be accounted for purely as a matter of
innate right, because in most claims of cosmopolitan right, “making contact
is typically based on choice.”152 Traders, tourists, and traveling dance
troupes could very well have gone there rather than come here.
The ﬁrst response to these claims is that the “right to be somewhere” is
not how Kant puts it. Instead, he speaks of a visitor’s right to be “where
he is,” or where nature or chance, apart from his will, has placed him.
This is not a right to some spot on earth, but to the spot where you are
right now, which is just where you cannot help but be. Considered in this
way, the ground beneath your feet becomes as inseparable from you as
your shadow. This elemental fact structures the forms of coercive interac-
tions you can have with other persons. This brings us to Niesen’s argument
about the rights of voluntary visitors requiring more than innate right.
Imagine that somebody invites you to a party at her country house, and
you freely choose to accept. On the day, you arrive at the gate and the foot-
man ushers you in. However, just as you are hanging up your coat, your host
changes her mind and orders you out of her house. This is most unwelcom-
ing but, as we saw earlier, wholly within her right, such that you wrong her
in trespass if you stay. Nevertheless, you still have a bare license to remain on
the property for so long as it takes you to pick yourself up, take your coat,
walk through the portico, down the driveway, and so on, simply because
as an embodied being, you cannot instantaneously teleport yourself away.
This point is somewhat occluded in English law, where trespasses are
often described as violations of property rights actionable per se—that is,
the instant you set foot on another’s land even if you do so under an
150. Id. at 38–39.
151. Jakob Huber, Cosmopolitanism for Earth Dwellers: Kant on the Right to Be Somewhere, 22
KANTIAN REV. 1, 8 (2017). See also BYRD & HRUSCHKA, supra note 69, at 128 (“The place I have
a right to be is not any permanent place, but rather some place or other on the earth. The
right to a place on the earth is thus not a right to a speciﬁc place, but a right to some place.”).
152. Niesen, supra note 2, at 102.
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innocent mistake.153 Nevertheless, liability is not strict: trespass does not lie
if you were involuntarily dropped onto the plaintiff’s land by another,154 or
if you traversed it because the public roads were ﬂooded.155 You may not be
held liable for simply being there. This principle is exhibited more clearly in
the Roman law, where trespasses are considered objectionable as invasions
of privacy; that is, as outrages of rights in personality. You do not wrong
another simply by wandering into their land. If they tell you to leave, you
must do so within reasonable delay. You wrong them only if you stick
around beyond this, because this expresses contempt for their dignitas as
the owner of their land.156
In this way, a voluntary visitor may not be treated with hostility simply
because she is there.157 She is entitled to this because her person exists
in space. In essence, hers is not a claim in vindicatio to a thing (a place),
but in condictio to a standard of treatment (to be allowed to remain in
her place until she can remove herself). That standard is hospitality, and
the obligation it connotes is personal. States may not contract away their obli-
gations to others,158 because their status as public ﬁduciaries is as much part
of their person as their body or reputation.159 An innkeeper cannot refuse a
traveler even if there are other “separate and equal” establishments nearby.
Likewise, a receiving state may not outsource its obligations of asylum any
153. See Entick v. Carrington, (1765) Howell’s St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (K.B.) (Eng.) (“By the laws
of England every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.”); Basely
v. Clarkson (1681) 3 Lev. 37 (Eng.) (plaintiff given judgment for two shillings against adjoining
neighbor who mistakenly mowed grass on plaintiff’s land); Severn Trent Water Ltd v. Barnes
[2004] EWCA (Civ) 570, ¶ 5 (Eng.) (damages awarded for “trivial, accidental and uninten-
tional” entry onto land).
154. Smith v. Stone (1647) Sty. 65 (Eng.).
155. Taylor v. Whitehead (1781) 99 Eng. Rep. 475 (K.B.) (Eng.).
156. See David L. Carey Miller, Public Access to Private Land in Scotland, 15 POTCHEFSTROOM
ELECTRONIC L.J. / POTCHEFSTROOMSE ELEKTRONIESE REGSBLAD 119, 120 (2012) (“. . . [T]he land-
owner has an enforceable right to require a trespasser to leave but there is no civil claim for
the act of trespass per se as there is, on the basis of the ‘tort of trespass,’ in English law.”);
WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW: A COMPARISON IN
OUTLINE (2d ed. 1965), at 102 (trespass actionable in Roman law only if the owner “had
expressly forbidden entry or if it was an enclosure, such as a dwelling-house, into which every-
one knew that free entry would be forbidden. . . .”).
157. See DPP 23:172–173:
So erkennt der beduinische Araber bey einem vor seinem Zelt sich einﬁndenden
Fremden die Pﬂicht der Wirthbarkeit selbst wenn er nach dem friedlichen Empfang
ihn von sich abweiset. Auf diese Wirthbarkeit kann der Fremdling Anspruch machen
(nicht aber auf ein Gastrecht als wozu ihn sein Wirth besonders einladen müßte) als
auf ein Besuchsrecht welches allen Menschen vermöge der Freyheit des ihnen von
der Natur angewiesenen Raumes zukommt.
In the published version, Kant removes these approving remarks about the Bedouins and turns
them into exemplars of Unwirtbarkeit who regard every “approach to nomadic tribes as a right
to plunder them.” PP 8:358, 329.
158. DIG. 49.1.4.5 (MACER 1, DE APPELLATIONIBAS) (“Procuratorem alium procuratorem facere non
posse.”). An equivalent common law maxim is delegata potestas non potest delegare.
159. DIG. 47.10.1.2 (ULPIAN, AD EDICTUM 56). See also DR 6:328–329, 470–471.
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more than it may prostitute its territory or sell its people. The reason why
one state may not offshore its asylum obligations is the same reason why
another may not onshore them.
CONCLUSION
Explaining cosmopolitan right by analogy to the private law of innkeeping
helps clear up some mysteries. First, when Kant says cosmopolitan right has
nothing to do with philanthropy, he means it. Second, Kantian hospitality
entails onerous public, ﬁduciary obligations that no private person can or
should ever bear. Third, the cosmopolitan obligations of receiving states
have nothing to do with acquisition or ownership of property, but obtain
solely in virtue of their public role and the form of relationship vis-à-vis
any particular visitor. Where the visitor is peaceable, capable of supporting
herself, and able to return to her own political community, all that she has a
right to is to present herself for society. Where the visitor does not have a
political community, such that turning her away would bring about her
civil death, the receiving state must let her stay simply so she can rightfully
occupy the spot on earth where she cannot help but be.
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